

De-Synchronisation Attack Modelling in Real-Time Protocols Using Queue Networks: Attacking the ISO/IEC 61850 Substation Automation Protocol

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Defining our Problem

- Does the IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 standards meet the security and quality of service (QoS) promises laid out in its specification?
- If there are omissions, can they be exploited?
- Can these attacks still occur in a fully compliant implementation of the protocol?

The Protocol Problem

- The assumption in the research community is that the security and QoS promises of Smart Grid communications protocols are consistent throughout. However, there is little work on verifying them.
- No one has checked if the security promises come into conflict with the QoS requirements.
- Making sure that these promises are true could prevent some theorised attacks.

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Queuing Theory in Security

- Queuing theory is good tool for modelling Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
- Most DoS models provide limited insight as most of them rely on M/M/1 queues or Jackson Networks.
- However, there have been some features from the literature that have been included in the framework that is being developed.

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 - However, there have been some features from the literature that have been included in the framework that is being developed.
- 1 Split state spaces
 - 2 Limited capacity queues
 - 3 Non-exponential probability distributions.

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Overview

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- The assumptions made by the framework are:-
 - 1 First-In-First-Out (FIFO) discipline for processing packets.
 - 2 Uses the Blocked-at-Service discipline.
 - 3 The effective probability distribution describing the rate at which packets are processed and unblocked are exponential distributions, but the sum of the distributions isn't.
 - 4 That the transition between states is memoryless.

The Probability of Queuing Theory

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- $$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \pi_j q_{ji} = \pi_i \sum_{j \in \mathcal{I}} q_{ij} \quad (1)$$

- $$\mathbf{0} = \pi \mathbf{Q} \quad (2)$$

- $$\sum \pi_i = 1. \quad (3)$$

The Topological Space

- The framework must calculate the parameters that govern how each queue in the network performs.
- The framework assumes for each queue that $a + b \leq c$ & $a + b + w \leq K$. As well as packets not returning to previous queues.
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Parameter	Description
K_i	Maximum capacity
μ_i	Service rate
γ_i	External arrival rate
$\phi(i, 1)$	Average number of distinct target queues
p_{ij}	Probability of packet transmission

The Topological Space continued

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Variable	Description
$P(N_i = K_i) = \frac{(1-\rho_i)\rho_i^{K_i}}{1-\rho_i^{K_i+1}}$	Probability of being full
$\lambda_i = \frac{\lambda_i^{eff}}{1-P(N_i=K_i)}$	Total arrival rate
$\lambda_i^{eff} = \gamma_i(1 - P(N_i = K_i)) + \sum_j p_{ji}\lambda_j^{eff}$	Effective arrival rate
$\mathcal{P}_i = \sum_j p_{ij}P(N_j = K_j)$	Probability being blocked
$\frac{1}{\widetilde{\mu}_i^a} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{I}^+} \frac{\lambda_j^{eff}}{\lambda_i^{eff} \mu_j^{eff}}$	Common acceptance rate
$\frac{1}{\mu_i^{eff}} = \frac{1}{\mu_i} + \frac{\mathcal{P}_i}{\widetilde{\mu}_i^a \phi(i,1)}$	Effective service rate

The State Space

- The framework state space shows the probability of the each queue having a specific number of packets.

$$\mathcal{I} = \{(k_1, \dots, k_N) \in \mathbb{N}^N\} \quad (4)$$

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Initial state s	New state t	Rate q_{st}	Conditions
(i, \dots)	$(i + 1, \dots)$	λ_i	$\rho_{0i} \neq 0 \ \& \ N_i \leq k_i - 1$
(\dots, i)	$(\dots, i - 1)$	μ_i^{eff}	$\rho_{0i} \neq 0 \ \& \ N_i \geq 1$
$(\dots, i, \dots, j, \dots)$	$(\dots, i - 1, \dots, j + 1, \dots)$	μ_i^{eff}	$\rho_{ij} \neq 0 \ \& \ N_i \geq 1 \ \& \ N_j \leq k_j - 1$

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- The marginal probability in this state space is

$$\pi_i(k) = \sum \pi(k_1, \dots, k_N) \quad (5)$$

Performance Metrics

- From the marginal probabilities performance metrics can be calculated.

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Performance Metric	Equation
Traffic Intensity	$\rho_i = \sum_{k=1}^k \pi_i(k)$
Throughput	$\lambda_i = \sum_{k=1}^k \pi_i(k) \mu_i^{eff}$
Total Throughput	$\lambda = \sum_{i=1}^N \lambda_{0i}$
Mean Number of Packets	$\bar{k}_i = \sum_{k=1}^k k \pi_i(k)$
Mean Queue Length	$\bar{q}_i = \sum_{k=c_i}^k (k - c_i) \pi_i(k)$
Mean Response Time	$\bar{T}_i = \frac{\bar{k}_i}{\lambda_i}$
Mean Wait Time	$\bar{W}_i = \bar{T}_i - \frac{1}{\mu_i^{eff}}$
Mean Number of visits	$e_i = \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda}$
Relative Utilisation	$x_i = \frac{e_i}{\mu_i^{eff}}$


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The Setup - Part 1

- The attack causes the client's and server's state machines to become de-synchronised.
- This is achieved by either increasing or decreasing the rate at which the server receives the *oper* – *req[TestOK]* message.
- The de-synchronisation of state occurs because the standard can be interpreted as not requiring the server to send out a *timeout* message to the client.
- The adversary in this attack is the same the symbolic one described by Dolev-Yao model.

The Setup - Part 2



The Result




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Future Direction-Framework

- Include the ability to calculate conditional probabilities of events.
- Include state spaces of the possible internal states of each queue.
- Include packet dropping in the model.

Future Direction-Analysis

- Develop weaker adversary models.
- Generate a taxonomy of attacks against Smart Grid protocols.
- Find instances of the attacks with IEC 61850 and IEC 62351.

Questions?